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Abstract
Purpose – Agricultural aggregation schemes provide numerous farmer-facing benefits, including reduced
transportation costs and improved access to higher-demand urban markets. However, whether aggregation
schemes also have positive food security dimensions for consumers dependent on peri-urban and local markets
in developing country contexts is currently unknown. This paper aims to narrow this knowledge gap by
exploring the actors, governance structures and physical infrastructures of the horticultural value chain of
Bihar, India, to identify barriers to using aggregation to improve the distribution of fruits and vegetables to
more local market environments.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses mixed methods. Quantitative analysis of market
transaction data explores the development of aggregation supply pathways over space and time. In turn, semi-
structured interviews with value chain actors uncover the interactions and decision-making processes with
implications for equitable fruit and vegetable delivery.
Findings –Whilst aggregation successfully generatesmultiple producer-facing benefits, the supply pathways
tend to cluster around urban export-oriented hubs, owing to the presence of high-capacity traders, large
consumer bases and traditional power dynamics. Various barriers across thewider enabling environmentmust
be overcome to unlock the potential for aggregation to increase local fruit and vegetable delivery, including
informal governance structures, cold storage gaps and underdeveloped transport infrastructures.
Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first critical analysis of
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equitable and sustainable development of horticultural systems both in Bihar and in similar low- and middle-
income settings.
Keywords Horticulture, Value chain, Markets, Trade-offs, Mixed methods
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Consistent with Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015), there is increasing
recognition that food systems and their value chains should benefit the spectrum of society
(FAO, 2014). However, inadequate access to nutritious foods such as fruits and vegetables
(F&V), vital in the combat against multiple forms of cancer, cardiovascular disease and all-
cause mortality (Aune et al., 2017), is often marked by inadequate availability, a lack of
nutritional awareness amongst consumers and disempowerment (Hawkes and Ruel, 2011;
Maestre et al., 2017). As such, food value chain interventionsmust becomemore responsive to
the needs of vulnerable populations (Gelli et al., 2015; Hawkes and Ruel, 2011), including how
distributional pathways, market governance and consumer preferences influence the
equitable delivery of healthy and nutritious foods.
Improving the supply of F&V to markets is generally considered to be an important first
step in improving their consumption amongst populations with seasonal or perennial barriers
to access (Hawkes and Ruel, 2008). Development practice has long experience with market
systems “upgrades” that have the potential to improve supply and financial returns to specific
value chain actors (Devaux et al., 2018; Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Such interventions have a
chequered history in India, where the median daily intake of F&Vwas recently estimated to be
50%of theWorldHealth Organization’s (WHO) 400 g/capita/day recommendation (Choudhury
et al., 2020), with rural F&V consumption potentially as low as 160 g/capita/day (Minocha et al.,
2018). Although national F&V production has tripled since the 1990s, retail prices have not
responded proportionately (Rahman, 2012). Moreover, the introductions of intensification
technologies have been challenged by poor technological know-how, unreliable extension
efforts and the reluctance to give up traditional cultivation and marketing techniques (Kumari
et al., 2017; World Bank, 2007). Further downstream, only 0.3% of the national cold chain
capacity stored F&V in 2011 (Halder and Pati, 2011), withwastage rates between farm and fork
estimated to be up to 30–40% (Minocha et al., 2018; Narula, 2011).
Therefore, based around a producer-oriented horticultural aggregation scheme in Bihar,
India, we ask what are the opportunities and barriers facing supply-enhancing value chain
upgrades in the improvement of F&V deliveries to low-capacity, infrastructurally
underdeveloped markets in often isolated localities? From this central research question,
we also make three contributions to the existing literature.
First, aggregation schemes are principally farmer-facing interventions: bulking,
transporting and marketing agricultural supplies to provide convenience and reduce
transaction costs for multiple farmers (Shepherd, 2018). Through vehicle access, aggregation
may also open up markets which were previously inaccessible to smallholders (Wiggins and
Compton, 2016). However, despite their potential benefits, aggregation schemes are
underrepresented in the literature relative to other forms of market upgrades (Hainzer
et al., 2019). Where documented, aggregation schemes often involve high-input subsidies, for
example, in the provision of expensive seeds in Ugandan Afro-Kai sorghum aggregation
(World Bank, 2018) and the provision of cold storage in vegetable aggregation in Tamil Nadu,
India (Govil et al., 2014). In the case of the Indian Samriddhii scheme, heavily subsidised
transport attempted to bypass the network of market middlemen, only to find that farmers
valued the loans and inputs provided by the samemiddlemen (Anjalay andBhamoriya, 2011).
We aim to widen the limited body of evidence around the characteristics of aggregation
schemes that influence the flows of F&V, information and finance in developing country
contexts.
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Second, previous research into aggregation tends to trace the value chain as far as the
market – meaning downstream impacts, and particularly the implications for consumers,
remain unexplored.Where analysis exists (e.g. Kubzansky et al., 2011;Wiggins and Compton,
2016), aggregation schemes are found to predominantly supply large, top of the chain buyers
– such as supermarkets and processing facilities – owing to the supply of high quality in bulk
and over long distances. Therefore, we chase the value chain downstream of the first buyer, to
explore whether any increases in supply or the reorganisation of distribution associated with
aggregation has potential implications for F&V availability for access-vulnerable consumers.
Third, and based upon the identification of value chain barriers and opportunities, we
scope potential future scenarios that may help to align aggregation with the needs of the
wider population to access affordable F&V. Our analysis, based on the “Loop” aggregation
scheme of the non-governmental organisation Digital Green in Bihar (Figure 1), continues the
drive to develop such studies from one-time snapshots to integrated assessments of the
structures, feedbacks and leverage points that underpin our food systems (Devaux et al.,
2018; Orr and Donovan, 2018).
The next section contextualises Loop within its horticultural system, before Section 3
outlines the rapid value chain analysis (VCA) approach. Section 4.1 describes the value chain
and its constraints upon the equitable delivery of F&V, before Section 4.2 analyses the
evolution of Loop over both space and time. We finish by discussing (1) the issues
practitioners may face when grappling with the consumer-facing dimensions of aggregation,
(2) the scenarios that may improve the equitable F&V delivery of aggregation, (3) the wider
contributions and limitations of our approach.
2. Loop within the horticultural context of Bihar
Bihar has the lowest GDP per capita of all Indian states, with an estimated 34% of the
population earning less than $1.25/day (World Bank, 2016). Whilst Bihar is the third largest
producer of vegetables and eighth largest producer of fruits amongst Indian states,
approximately 70% of vegetable production originates from small (1–2 ha) or marginal
(<1 ha) landholdings (Sinha and Kumar, 2015). As of 2012, the average per capita F&V
consumption rate was approximately 35–45% of the WHO’s recommended 400 g/capita/day
(NSSO, 2013), with rural consumption roughly 12% less than urban.
Figure 1.
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Horticultural marketing is predominantly traditional, informal and unregulated (Kumari
et al., 2020; World Bank, 2007). The vast majority of F&V production is sold fresh, with the
state’s 290 cold storage units “almost exclusively used for the storage of potato” (Minten et al.,
2011, p. 5). Bihar’s horticultural system is therefore characterised by a network of marginal
landholdings and production systems that are vulnerable to climate-driven losses,
seasonality and wastage. Moreover, financially poor consumers and underdeveloped
transport infrastructures magnify upstream barriers to further suppress downstream F&V
availability.
Against this backdrop, Digital Green launched the Loop aggregation scheme in January
2016, with the explicit aims of pooling F&V produce to cut transport costs, negotiate higher
prices, save marketing time and increase market access and information for farmers (Digital
Green, 2017). Each participating cluster of 3–4 neighbouring villages has a vehicle-owning
aggregator, who either directly supplies market traders through prearrangement or enters
into spot negotiations with commission agents known locally as “gaddidars.”
Beyond the coordination of supplies from over 28,000 farmers, Loop also provides various
technology-based innovations relative to traditional collective marketing methods (e.g. the
hiring of public transport). Rather than hailing a bus or an autorickshaw at the roadside,
farmers can reserve market transport by contacting their aggregator one day in advance.
Aggregators record various market transaction details in the Loop smartphone application
(e.g. market name, quantity sold and per unit price), which provides farmers with a digital
receipt of past transactions. In turn, farmers and aggregators have access to a market price
telephone “hotline” to aid transparency and price discovery. Although aggregators do not
formally backhaul F&V or inputs to the villages under Loop, they often pursue other
transporting and/or marketing work once a buyer has been found for their aggregation.
Moreover, the market-bound transport costs aggregators incur are subtracted from the
farmers markets revenues, and Digital Green as a not-for-profit organisation also
remunerates aggregators with an additional 0.1 Rs per kg aggregated.
However, according to “Loop dashboard” data (Section 3.2), the 80,500 tonnes of F&V
aggregated between January 2016 and September 2018 was highly skewed towards urban
wholesale markets, with 58.0% of total supplies delivered to only ten horticultural markets
(out of 105 supplied in total). Therefore, given the potential for aggregation to coordinate
smallholders and influence market supplies, it is important to investigate (a) the value chain
functions, priorities and vested interests that may undermine efforts to improve F&V
delivery to access-vulnerable consumers, and (b) consider potential interventions that may
overcome such barriers to co-produce benefits for aggregating farmers and small market
consumers.
3. Materials and methods
This rapid VCA encompasses Loop within the horticultural value chain of Bihar, including
the actors and operations downstream of markets that process, store and/or add value en
route to consumers (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). We integrate qualitative data from
stakeholder interviews and quantitative data from the “Loop dashboard” (publicly available:
www.loopapp.org/loop/analytics). Prior to data collection, ethical clearance was obtained
from the ethics board of the university leading the research.
3.1 Primary data
We conducted 49 interviews with actors across the value chain (Table 1). With Loop only
registering transactions in Buxar since November 2017, the first round of interviews (April–
May 2018) focussed on perceptions of recent changes to farming activities, marketing habits
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and livelihood outcomes, relative to their activities prior to Loop membership (Appendix 1).
The second phase of interviews (August–September 2018) focussed on the procurement and
trading activities of actors facing downstream of F&V markets (Appendix 1). To capture
heterogeneity in downstream pathways, interviews were split between the districts of Buxar,
Bhojpur, Nalanda, Patna and Muzaffarpur (Figure 1).
Participants were co-selected with Digital Green, using purposeful and snowball sampling
to select actors with rounded knowledge of Loop and/or their specific value chain segment.
Rather than being designed for statistical representativeness, the interviews aimed to map
the range of actors and decision-making processes driving F&V between farm and fork, as
well as narratives around how aggregation has introduced changes to the value chain.Whilst
focussing on the participant’s specialist knowledge, the interview scripts retained flexible
structures to allow any narratives of particularly interest to be followed. Informed consent
was sought before each interview, with additional consent sought before audio recordings.
Interviews lasted 45–60 min and were recorded in Hindi before a research assistant from
Digital Green assisted with English translation.
We acknowledge the potential limitations of our sampling strategy, namely the selection
of only Loop farmers and the pressure they may have felt to give positive accounts of
aggregation. All farmers selected had accruedmost of their farming experience before joining
Loop, with the aggregation scheme introduced no more than 2 years before the interviews
took place. Therefore, the farmers interviewed were qualified to speak about the non-Loop
aspects of the value chain, as well as any perceived changes to production, marketing and
trading activities. Prior to the interviews, all actors were notified that neither their
participation nor responses would affect their aggregation participation, with all interviews
anonymised at the point of transcription. All questions were neutrally framed to avoid
leading the interviewee into making a critical judgement of Loop.
3.2 Secondary data
A particularly valuable resource available to this research is the “Loop dashboard”, which
provides a near real-time record of market transactions (i.e. the sale of one vegetable product
from one Loop farmer, represented by an aggregator, to one market buyer). The dashboard
contains over 700,000 transactions at the time of writing (mid-2020), including the F&V type,
quantity, per unit price and financial revenue of each transaction, alongside the locations of
markets and producer villages. The database also contains metadata detailing additional
value chain dimensions, including the gender of Loop farmers, the cost of aggregation and the
type of aggregation vehicle used. However, the dashboard does not track produce beyond the
first buyer, highlighting the need for qualitative data downstream of markets.
The dashboard is standalone in its systematic collection of market data in Bihar. The
Government of Bihar publishes annual reports with crop-wise production volumes that are
aggregated to the state level over the last 12months (GoB, 2019). In turn, the AgMarket portal
Participant Phase
District name
TotalsBhojpur Buxar Muzaffarpur Nalanda Patna
Loop farmer 1 – 14 – – – 14
Aggregator 1 – 4 – – – 4
Commission agent 1 – 2 – – – 2
Inter-market wholesaler 2 – 1 1 2 – 4
Retailer 2 – 4 2 3 8 17
Consumer 2 1 3 1 3 – 8
Totals 1 28 4 8 8 49
Table 1.
District-wise







(http://www.agmarknet.gov.in/) of the Directorate of Marketing & Inspection (DMI) purports
to collect commodity-wise price and arrival statistics across all of India’s 28 states and eight
union territories; however, at the time of writing, no data exists for any of the vegetables
aggregated in the study districts. Lastly, the “MIS Daily Report” of the National Horticultural
Board (http://www.nhb.gov.in/OnlineClient/MISDailyReport.aspx) provides daily statistics
for 26 F&V types arriving at markets across Indian state capitals; however, the report lacks
themetadata needed tomeaningfully interpret the time series (e.g. market names and number
of transactions). Therefore, comparative analysis of Loop and non-Loop outcomes is
constrained by the lack of quantitative data from the wider value chain. Consequently,
quantitative analysis focusses on how the spatiotemporal development of Loopmay reinforce
or overcome the value chain barriers to adequate F&V delivery.
Dashboard data was obtained from Digital Green in CSV format and analysed in the
statistical software R (2013). To visualise village to market aggregation supply pathways
(Section 4.2), the georeferenced dashboard data was processed in the Geographical
Information System “QGIS.”
4. Results
4.1 Barriers and opportunities across the wider value chain
4.1.1 Traditional supply pathways. As aggregation schemes do not exist in isolation, we first
identify the actors, pathways and governance settings of the wider chain, focussing on the
decisions and processes with implications for aggregation and the potential to achieve F&V
delivery outcomes.
Whilst the horticultural value chain takes various local forms, F&V production generally
flows downstream from farms to consumers via channels of agents, inter-market traders and
retailers (Figure 2). These channels are unregulated, informal and almost entirely dependent
on trust-based relationships. Farmers traditionally self-supply markets on foot, bicycle or
autorickshaw. At the market, farmers meet with commission agents at traditional “gaddidar
markets” or direct with downstream buyers at “farmers markets” (i.e. without gaddidars).
Farmers could also meet with government agents during the operational years of the
Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC); however, the act was repealed in Bihar
in 2006 to deregulate marketing activities.
Furthermore, farmers may sell to farmgate traders who purchase from multiple farmers
within one village. To attract supplies during the lean season (e.g. June–August, Appendix 3),
traders specialising inmajor crops such as tomato, cauliflower and cabbagemay offer rates of
Rs 2–3/kg (8–12%) higher than the local market. However, these farmgate traders tend to
offer prices of 1–2 Rs/kg (12–25%) lower than markets during supply highs (e.g. December–
March), knowing that farmers want to conveniently “dump produce that might not sell”
otherwise (Farmer 2, Buxar district) [1].
4.1.2 Commission agents. The primary function of a gaddidar is to connect upstream
sellers with downstream buyers in exchange for a commission, which generally ranges
between 1–7% of the transaction value. Gaddidars may also then charge the buyer for fixing
the transaction, with local traders charged the same as the farmer and traders from external
markets charged up to double the local rate.
With gaddidar commissions subtracting from farmer revenues and ultimately inflating
retail prices, we found debate amongst farmers and aggregators as to whether gaddidars are
beneficial. For example, two farmers in Buxar district expressed a preference for markets with
gaddidars, who are perceived to take “considerable financial and reputational risk on behalf of
farmers” (Farmer 2). In contrast, farmers markets in towns such as Dumri (Buxar) and Ganj
Bazar (Muzaffarpur) allow farmers, retailers and traders to interact directly.Aggregator 3 (Ganj
Bazar) reasoned that farmers markets “benefit every stage of the chain from producer to
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consumer” because farmers and traders do not pay commission, traders can purchase
perishable products directly at source and consumers welcome lower retail prices from fewer
intermediaries. However, the reluctance of local retailers to purchase in bulk means that
aggregators risk being left with unsellable produce. Furthermore, the tendency for smaller
transactions can cause traders to offset the costs of wastage by inflating their margins by 1–3
Rs/kg – with negative implications for downstream consumer-facing affordability.
Where present, gaddidars play a central role in value chain governance, conceptualised as
the ability to influence relationships between different actors (Gereffi et al., 2005). For new
entrants into the market, transactions often conform to market-based governance, owing to
the ad-hoc nature of buyer–seller interactions and the low financial costs of switching
relationships. However, mature, long-term relationships that form between farmers/
aggregators and gaddidars resemble relational governance structures. Despite the absence
of formal contracts, mutual dependence is harboured as gaddidars are the main source of
market knowledge and price information. Moreover, gaddidars provide an independent
assessment of F&V quality – highly valued by farmers without the know-how or
infrastructure to grade produce before the market. Therefore, the security provided by
gaddidars helps to entrench village to market pathways, with the interviewed farmers
generally prioritising the maintenance of business and social relationships above short-term
price benefits.
Gaddidars may also provide storage and/or loans to farmers to purchase inputs such as
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interviewed gaddidars tended not to charge interest, recognising that “debt-laden farmers
would struggle to purchase inputs” (Gaddidar 1, Buxar district), whichwould feedback to harm
commission generation. Therefore, whilst Loop does not require farmers to supply particular
vegetables, having potentially positive implications for the diversity of F&V available at both
the farmandmarket levels, the flexibility to supply differentmarkets is affected bypre-existing
relationships between farmers and gaddidars. This rigiditymay be further compounded by the
difficulties associated with market entry, with Farmer 5 (Buxar district) estimating that it may
take “more than ten profitable transactions to build trust between buyer and seller”.
4.1.3 Inter-market traders. Inter-market traders may be categorised into distance and local
traders, with the former purchasing F&V from local markets to sell outside of their district
and/or state, and the latter operating solely around neighbouring markets. Traders also
transport different F&V quantities; for example, distance traders in Bihar Sharif (Nalanda)
export up to 30,000 kg/day during the local high season, while local traders may handle
between 2,200 and 2,500 kg/day. These capacities are partly a function of the type of vehicle
used, with distance traders typically employing pickup, flatbed or “all-India permit” goods
trucks (2,000–5,000 kg capacities); in contrast, local traders mainly rely on public transport or
privately owned vehicles (∼500 kg capacities). Consequently, distance traders only operate
from markets with sufficient F&V supplies, infrastructure and physical space, which tend to
be located in district capitals.
Distance traders also influence market price formation by basing their buying price on the
price they expect to receive at the distance market; for example, in cities such as Patna,
Asansol and Kathmandu, the expected price can be “∼20 Rs/kg higher than second-tier urban
markets in Bihar” (Trader 2, Muzaffarpur district). Distance traders may also seasonally
adapt their sources and destinations to keep margins competitive. For example, in August
2018, Trader 1 in Dumraon (Buxar district) imported tomatoes from Maharashtra where
prices fell to 2 Rs/kg. Post-monsoon, the trader exported tomatoes to regions 200–300 km to
the south for a 5–8 Rs/kg margin.
All three distance traders interviewed noted that the growth in production and supply
over the past 5 years has been offset by an increasing number of traders. In parallel, the
interviewed farmers perceived more competitive pricing and supply options, with the
increasing export of F&Vby out-of-state traders potentially undercutting the availability and
affordability of horticultural products in access-vulnerable local markets.
4.1.4 Retailers. Stationary market-based wholesalers tend to market F&V quantities
around 10 kg to commercially oriented customers, including traders, restaurateurs, grocery
stores and roadside vendors, while retailersmay sell 1–2 kg to individuals consuming F&V at
home. In peri-urban Bihar, local F&V markets consist of 20–30 retailers, whilst rural village
haats may consist of only 20 farmers retailing their own harvests to local consumers.
Therefore, as the points of contact for relatively access-vulnerable consumers, F&V retailers
are key to regulating the flows and prices of F&V in peri-urban and rural markets.
Household consumers inMuzaffarpur and Buxar districts tend to visit twice-weekly retail
markets (e.g. Wednesday and Sunday in Ganj Bazar, Muzaffarpur district), which are driven
by self-organisation and coordination across the chain, as opposed to formal regulations.
Retailer 4 in Buxar perceives retail markets as “win-wins for everyone”, with consumers able
to access a wider range of fresh F&V due to farmers targeting these days to boost their own
revenues. However, access is not universal, with retailers increasing prices by 1–2 Rs/kg (5–
10%) above the wholesale price in response to heightened demands. Similarly, even on
regular market days at Patna’s Anta Ghat market, retailers were found to reduce prices by 4
Rs/kg (15–20%) for purchases of more than 1 kg, reflecting the desires of retailers to attract
small-scale traders (e.g. restaurateurs and vendors) to offset expected wastage from retail
transactions. Therefore, even in urban areas, the elastic dynamics of retailers and local
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markets may have negative implications for the poorest consumers, with inflated prices
restricting access to the full range of F&V.
Moreover, the same quantity of the same vegetable may be priced differently according to
quality, with retailers in Nalanda, Buxar and Muzaffarpur arguing that customers consider
F&V shape, freshness and bruising when negotiating prices. The retailers interviewed stated
that low-grade produce is generally priced up to 50% less than high-grade, which normally
translates into a 5–10 Rs/kg difference. Compounded by the tendency of retailers to increase
prices when small volumes are being purchased, financially constrained consumers often
have to settle for F&V that is relatively “less fresh and less tasteful” (Consumer 5 – Nalanda
district) than local high-grade produce.
4.1.5 Consumers.Average F&V consumption rates in Bihar are approximately 35–45% of
the WHO benchmark of 400 g/capita/day. Moreover, the consumption of nine of the NSSO’s
15 F&V groups declined in Bihar between 2005–2006 and 2011–2012 (including mangoes,
leafy vegetables, gourds, carrots and “other vegetables”), whilst the consumption of tomato
rose ten-fold, and the consumption of potato and “onion and garlic” increased by 18 and 10%,
respectively (NSSO, 2013). Reflecting wider consumption patterns in India (Minocha et al.,
2018), these Bihar-specific trends suggest a drift away from the consumption of vegetables
(from an already low baseline) towards relatively energy-dense food items.
The consumers interviewed shared numerous perceptions and preferences that may
reinforce the upstream barriers to equitable F&V delivery. Two consumers expressed a
preference to shop at larger markets, with Consumer 4 (Buxar district) claiming that regional
urban hubs such as Buxar offer “higher chances of negotiating, more vegetables, [and] more
choice”. Four of the consumers expressed a preference for local production, owing to the
perceptions that local produce is “tastier” (Consumer 5, Muzaffarpur district), “fresher”
(Consumer 6, Nalanda district) and “healthier” (Consumer 8, Nalanda district). The tendency
for local production to be more expensive reflects these perceptions and reinforces the
motivations of farmers to supply markets where consumers desire fresh local produce and
have the financial means to afford their purchase.
In timeswhen local varieties are unavailable and/or prices are high, consumerswere found
to (1) maintain the overall quantity purchased but increase the proportion of low-grade
produce to “make money stretch further” (Consumer 1, Buxar district), (2) cut the purchase of
fruits “when prices are high for a couple of days” (Consumer 7, Nalanda district) or (3) cut
quantities but prioritise high-grade produce to “manage the price” (Consumer 6, Nalanda
district). These coping mechanisms substitute quantity or quality in favour of affordability,
with such trade-offs likely to be magnified where F&V supplies are less reliable, storage
facilities are unavailable and consumer purchasing power is relatively constrained.
4.2 The spatiotemporal evolution of loop
Building on the characteristics of the wider value chain, this section outlines the
spatiotemporal evolution of the Loop aggregation system, before discussing its
interactions with the barriers to improving F&V delivery to access-vulnerable consumers.
4.2.1 Temporal evolution. Loop first established a diversity of aggregation products
between January 2016 and June 2017 (Figure 3a), before dramatically intensifying aggregation
quantities during the second half of 2017 (Figure 3b). This rapid intensification was triggered
byboth the five-fold increase in the number of farmers supplyingLoop as the scheme expanded
into Nawada, Khagadiya and Buxar districts and the timing of cauliflower, eggplant, tomato
and cabbage harvests which are grown in high volumes across Bihar from October to March
(Appendix 3).
The trends of per-farmer outcomes are more complex. Whilst the average supply quantity




In turn, the average revenue equalled 4,200 Rs/farmer/week (average of 2.5 supplies per week),
with revenues peaking during the onset of themonsoon season as F&V supplies begin to wane
(Figure 3e). The average cost incurred by farmers to transport Loop supplies tomarketwas 0.50
Rs/kg/farmer between January 2016 and September 2018 (including subsidies), whilst the oft-
quoted figure for non-Loop transport in Buxar, Nalanda and Muzaffarpur districts ranges
between 1.5 and 2.0 Rs/kg. However, Loop transport has become more expensive for farmers
over time (Figure 3f) due to the retraction of subsidies provided by Digital Green, which
averaged 72%of the transport cost in 2016, but 34%of the transport cost for the first 9 months
of 2018 [2].
Source(s): Loop dashboard. The summary statistics underlying the time series are provided in
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Row Value chain process Unit
Local retailer at gaddidar market Distance trader at farmers markets
Loop Non-loop Loop Non-loop
a Farmgate quantity kg 100 100 100 100
b Transport cost Rs/kg 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.5
c Loop commission Rs/kg 0.1 – 0.1 –
d Wastage en route to market % 0–5 0–5 0–5 0–5
e Market arrival quantity kg 95–100 95–100 95–100 95–100
f Gaddidar commission % 4 4 – –
g Gaddidar waste % 5–10 5–10 – –
h Quantity moving downstream kg 85.5–95.0 85.5–95.0 – –
i Distance trader price waste offset % – – 5–10 5–10
j Distance trader margin Rs/kg – – 4 4
k Distance trader wastage % – – 5–10 5–10
l Quantity moving downstream kg – – 77.0–90.3 77.0–90.3
m Retailer margin (local market) Rs/kg 2 2 – –
n Retailer waste (local market) % 5–10 5–10 – –
o Quantity moving downstream kg 77.0–90.3 77.0–90.3 – –
p Retailer margin (second market) Rs/kg – – 2 2
q Retailer waste (second market) % – – 5–10 5–10
r Quantity moving downstream Kg – – 69.3–85.8 69.3–85.8
s Consumer waste % 0–10 0–10 0–10 0–10
t Quantity consumed Kg 69.3–90.3 69.3–90.3 62.3–85.8 62.3–85.8
u Total food losses 5 a – t % 9.75–30.7 9.75–30.7 14.2–37.7 14.2–37.7
v Transport and marketing cost incurred by farmer 5 b þ c þ f þ i Rs 95–100 180.5–190 121–163 211–249
w Total marketing revenuey Rs 855–950 855–950 1,026–1,140 1,026–1,140
x Total net revenue from marketing 5 w – v Rs 755–855 665–769.5 863–1,019 777–929
y Producer’s share of consumer’s price % 66.2–71.2 58.3–64.1 50.4–56.6 45.4–51.6
Note(s): The table compares two typicalmarketing channels: (left) local retail market with commission agent; (right) distance trader channel. Figures are reported to three







































































This difference in per unit transport costs underpins the estimated 9.5–13.5% increase
in marketing net returns for Loop farmers relative to non-Loop farmers (Table 2), although
the exact benefit on any given day varies as a function of prices, commission rates and loss
rates. For instance, the interviewed traders estimated that loss rates may reach 10% for
highly perishable items such as chillies, okra and spinach, but remain 5% or less for
vegetables that are traditionally transported in crates, such as onion and tomato. Therefore,
whilst traditionally varying between 5 and 10% of the transaction’s value (Table 2), the
wastage levies that traders charge farmers to offset the risks of losses occurring
downstream depend on the product being traded and expectations around road, traffic and
weather conditions.
In addition, interviewed farmers explained how removing the need to visit the market has
provided time savings between 30 min for farmers living close to a market and 10 h for
farmers needing to travel and sit at a market until a buyer is found. Farmer 4 in Buxar district
noted that “the convenience [of Loop] has freed up the rest of mymorning”, with farmers now
investing the spare time into recreation, as well as on-farm, domestic and secondary revenue
generating activities.
It can be argued that Loop has built foundations to improve F&V availability and
affordability in local markets by stimulating: (1) lower marketing costs relative to non-Loop
pathways, (2) an increasingly diverse product base and (3) supplies to an increasing number
ofmarkets. However, whether these producer-facing successes can improve F&V availability
in local markets remains an open question.
4.2.2 Clustering of aggregation pathways. The spatial footprint of Loop represents a
network of village to market supply pathways. Decisions regarding which market to supply
are made jointly by farmers and aggregators, with the aggregators interviewed stressing the
importance of expected prices, transport costs and the assurance that all of the aggregation
will be sold.
The evolution of Loop over space largely reflects these decision-making processes. During
Loop’s expansion in 2017, 40% of supplies were sold to the large hub markets in Samastipur
and Bihar Sharif, which attract distance traders exporting in bulk to markets in the
neighbouring states of Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand and West Bengal. Consequently, hub
markets in Bihar tend to be the largest in terms of physical size and the volumes of produce
handled (i.e. >100 tonnes/day), as well as the most infrastructurally developed (i.e. surfaced
roads, electricity and storage).
The clustering of supply pathways is observable at the district level. Of the 33 villages
mapped in Bhojpur district, 24 have supplied Arra wholesale market (the district capital)
and 17 villages have supplied the neighbouring wholesale market in Kayamnagar
(Figure 4a). Aggregations can be seen to directly bypass smaller markets; for example, the
village of Chakia has transported 90% of its Loop supply to Arra (40 km to the north) and
only 10% of supplies to Garahani (less than half the distance to Arra). The average
aggregation quantities from Chakia to Arra and Garahani equal 1,800 kg and 1,200 kg,
respectively, which translate into transport costs of 0.49 Rs/kg for Arra (n 5 84) and 1.77
Rs/kg for Garahani (n 5 15).
Differences in transport costs further encourage supplies to higher-demand, higher-
capacity markets. Trader 2 (Muzaffarpur district) estimated that “80% of Loop supplies to
Ganj Bazar [wholesale market] are bought by distance traders”. This dynamic may reinforce
intra-market governance structures and is intrinsic to the preference for urban hub markets,
with convenience and guaranteed sales a priority for farmers and aggregators. Moreover,
through motorised four-wheeler provision, Loop farmers stated that they no longer rely on
short-range, low-capacity motorbikes and bicycles. This raises additional potential
challenges for equitable F&V delivery, as an aggregation of 1,500 kg is unlikely to fetch a
profitable price at a rural market with a capacity of 4,000–5,000 kg/day.
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Source(s):  Loop dashboard. Summary statistics underlying the village to market 
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This study has identified actors, interlinkages and decision-making processes that drive
F&V supplies across the horticultural value chain of Bihar. Numerous challenges exist
between the producer-driven outcomes of aggregation schemes and the wider desires to
improve F&V availability in access-vulnerable markets. Therefore, successfully utilising
improved producer mobility, lower transport costs and coordinated supplies to improve
equitable F&V delivery must overcome various social, infrastructural and financial barriers,
including an enabling environment oriented towards the financial demands of upstream
actors. Here we discuss plausible scenarios and pathways to overcome the identified barriers
and trade-offs, before evaluating our methodological approach.
5.1 Internal scenarios of change
Given that day-to-day participation in aggregation is voluntary, changes to aggregation
supply pathways must consider potential feedbacks on market access, costs and revenues.
For example, if Loop remains relatively profitable, the numbers of aggregating farmers may
continue to increase and/or farmers may aggregate more frequently. Yet, based on the
aggregation scheme’s evolution to date, doing nothing may strengthen the flows of F&V to
urban hubs, with potentially limited benefits for relatively isolated local markets.
Therefore, howmay aggregation schemes equitably guide F&V supplies towards smaller
markets? Whilst at present one vehicle aggregates the available supply from each cluster,
multiple vehicles could potentially supply different markets – although this strategy could
potentially undermine farmers’ uniform market access. To counter this, different rates of
subsidy could be introduced to reduce transport costs to smaller markets. Similar to the
pricing models of app-based taxis, subsidy rates could be linked to Loop supplies and/or
market demands. For example, regarding Chakia village (Section 4.2.2), Loop would have to
subsidise the current cost of supplying Garahani market by 77% to align with the cost of
supplying Arra. However, such an approach could quickly become complex, as subsidy rates
would need to be tailored to individual supply pathways that potentially vary day by day.
Given the retail price differences between high- and low-quality F&V can reach 50%,
aggregation could distribute lower-grade produce towards supply-limited markets in an
attempt to increase the availability of relatively cheap supplies. However, aggregators are not
traditionally involved in the F&V grading, meaning such tasks could increase the cost of
aggregation participation. Moreover, differentiating market destinations by F&V quality
may lead to divergent outcomes between farmers supplying different grades – potentially
leading to an inequitable “success to the successful” type scenario. Lastly, with perceptions of
food quality playing an increasingly important role in consumption decisions (Minten et al.,
2013; Patil et al., 2016), there is no guarantee that lower-grade produce would be purchased
even in access-limited areas of Bihar. The adaptability of aggregation supply pathways may
also be constrained by trust-based relationships between Loop and wider value chain actors.
Consistent with the findings of Minten et al. (2010) for horticultural wholesale markets in
Uttarkhand state, andVandeplas et al. (2013) for the dairy value chain of Punjab state, we find
that trust continues to inform market choices even when alternative marketing channels are
available and promoted – as in the case of Bihar, where APMC regulations were repealed in
2006. Therefore, efforts to adapt aggregation pathways must first escape the economic and
trust-based pull of the larger market, before establishing new relationships with commission
agents and traders in alternative markets. Even then, there is no guarantee that the end
consumer will change, as local traders in smaller markets may then supply larger regional
hubs. Therefore, the quantities, qualities and types of product supplied to smaller markets
would have to be carefully tailored to local demands to avoid crashing prices, increasing
wastage and degrading the long-term willingness of farmers/aggregators to supply rural
markets.
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5.2 Scenarios for the wider enabling environment
There is increasing recognition that improving the availability of F&V in developing
contexts is as much about distribution as it is production (Gupte and Longhurst, 2019).
Therefore, to simultaneously cut transportation costs whilst working towards consumer-
focussed goals, aggregation schemes in developing contexts such as north India need to be
supported by improvements in road connectivity, cold chains and market infrastructure,
which tend to be the responsibilities of district and/or state governments.
For instance, evidence from the potato value chain in Bihar suggests that cold storage can
dampen short-term price variations (Minten et al., 2011). Despite the number of cold storage
facilities increasing by 67% from 2000 to 2010, the latest data suggests that Bihar still has the
third widest horticultural cold storage deficit of all Indian states (Vanitha et al., 2013). Yet,
combined with reduced wastage rates, F&V storage may allow producers and traders to
better align supply with demand and better connect supplies to rural markets. Such a
strategy would require significant state investment to build new facilities (Narula, 2011) or a
weakening of the cold storage monopoly held by potato traders in Bihar (Minten et al., 2011).
Moreover, traders in Bihar Sharif market (Nalanda district) described how particular F&V
products would be moved into storage prior to festivals in order to artificially inflate prices.
Therefore, the expansion of cold storage in Bihar has to be carefully monitored to provide
equitable benefits for actors across the value chain.
Even if cold storage facilities are to be located geographically close to rural markets, poor
road qualities can produce “economic distances” that make supplying local markets
unattractive (Reardon, 2015). Although the length of roads in Bihar doubled between 2009
and 2018, only half of roads in and out of villages are paved (GoB, 2019). Consequently, rural
roads may be impassable for farmers dependent on bicycles or autorickshaws, whilst traders
and aggregators may have to take costly precautions to avoid damaging supplies (i.e.
additional packaging or longer routes).
Improving the connectivity of rural markets is counterproductive if any increase in
supplies will overwhelm market infrastructure and consumer demand. One approach to
counter this would be to increase the density of rural markets, with inter-market competition
promoting the diversity and quality of F&V (Chatterjee and Kapur, 2017). However, whilst
more markets might reduce economic distances for rural consumers, their limited capacities
are unlikely to attract bulky aggregations. Therefore, increasing the size of existing rural
markets may better accommodate aggregations whilst benefiting from economies of scale to
control infrastructure costs (e.g. space and electricity).
These external scenarios are ultimately interdependent: for instance, increases in rural
market capacities must be coupled with adequate transport and storage facilities to connect
farmers, traders and consumers to market. The different time scales must also be
acknowledged; whilst aggregations schemes may change their supply destinations daily,
changes to the enabling environment may follow government budget cycles. Therefore, the
consumer sensitivity of aggregation schemes in developing contexts may be constrained
until changes to the wider enabling environment unlock their nutritional potential.
5.3 Evaluating our VCA approach
The VCA conducted here integrates stakeholder interviews with spatiotemporal transaction
data to identify challenges of aligning aggregation with equitable F&V delivery. Whilst the
integration of qualitative and quantitative data is not novel in itself (see Minten et al., 2013;
Reardon et al., 2012), our approachmakes three contributions to the need tomake agricultural
value chains (and their assessments) work for all (Gelli et al., 2015; Hawkes and Ruel, 2011).
First, this analysis emphasises the importance of assessing specific interventions within
the wider context of the host value chain. Whilst traditional firm-level analysis may be




interference, more holistic approaches are required to capture the feedbacks, delays and
conflicts of interest that drive horticultural products downstream and the flows of
information and financial returns upstream. The traditional prioritisation of upstream
segments may have stopped short of analysing the downstream factors that modify the
potential for aggregation to align with consumer-facing goals, including the preference of
consumers to visit markets with a diverse choice of local produce and the tendency of traders
to reinforce underlying access vulnerabilities by inflating retail prices.
Second is the growing need to explore who benefits from value chain upgrades (Maestre
and Poole, 2018; Vicol et al., 2018). The integration of qualitative and quantitative information
here was key to identifying governance structures and trust-based relationships that
underpin the urban-centric supply pathways. Conversely, aligning aggregation with the
needs of access-vulnerable consumers risks weakening these relationships and trading-off
traditional value chain outcomes, such as market participation, revenues and efficiencies.
Therefore, establishing the feedbacks, interlinkages and governance structures across the
holistic value chain is key to identifying the synergies that work towards elusive win-win
futures (Klapwijk et al., 2014).
Third, this study supports the continued evolution of VCA approaches, from taking
snapshots at one point in time, to integrated approaches that capture the spatiotemporal
complexity of food systems. Given that food systems in developing countries are rapidly
lengthening and urbanising (Reardon et al., 2019; Reardon and Minten, 2011), the ability to
identify value chain complexities is a precondition to designing upgrades and policies that
appreciate the nonlinear nature of cause–effect pathways, unintended consequences and
trade-offs (Routroy and Behera, 2017).
This analysis is not without limitations. Despite capturing the roles and interlinkages of
actors, our VCA does not offer the same level of detail or statistical power as more specialist
techniques (e.g. dietary diversity surveys), particularly with regard to consumer preferences
and habits. In relation, whilst broadly consistent with the loss rates reported elsewhere for
Bihar (Kumari et al., 2017; World Bank, 2007) and India (Minocha et al., 2018; Parfitt et al.,
2010), it is important to acknowledge that the food loss rates and tradermargins reported here
derive from a small number of surveys that are primarily qualitative in nature. Moreover, the
traditional method to estimate F&V losses by mass may overestimate the contribution of
heavier, “low-value products” (FAO, 2019, p. xiii). Therefore, future value chain studies may
look to incorporate the economic values and/or nutritional importance of horticultural
products (e.g. the loss of micronutrients or protein availability) to better understand the
socioeconomic and health implications of food losses (FAO, 2019; Ritchie et al., 2018).
Finally, with the Loop dashboard lacking data on the quality of F&V sold through
aggregation, as well as data from before the intervention started, the diversion of F&V
quantities and qualities away from local markets has not been quantified. In spite of this, the
resolution and range of data available within the Loop dashboard are unparalleled for this
region. The incorporation of near real-time data into technology-based interventions is
strongly encouraged to allow time-sensitive value chain evaluations in future.
6. Conclusions: lessons for access-sensitive aggregation schemes
Through an assessment of the Loop aggregation scheme in Bihar, this paper has explored the
potential challenges of using aggregation to improve F&V availability in access-vulnerable
markets. As a launchpad for further enquiry, we summarise four key conclusions to be
considered when aligning aggregation with consumer-focussed goals, such as food prices
and availability.
First, Loop-type aggregation schemes provide economic and social benefits for producers.
Loop has cut transport costs by at least half relative to non-Loop supply pathways, and
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access to motor vehicles has empowered farmers to supply more distant, higher-demand
markets. Moreover, Loop may save farmers up to 10 h per market day by removing the need
to visit themarket. Such conveniencemay be particularly beneficial for farmers withmobility
limitations (i.e. elderly farmers) and/or domestic responsibilities (i.e. female farmers).
However, secondly, these producer-facing outcomes may not immediately translate into
widespread consumer-focussed benefits. Although the promotion of horticulture through
Loop may increase F&V availability at the farm household level, aggregated volumes are
often too bulky to be absorbed by local markets. In association, we observe the clustering of
aggregation pathways around regional hubs, including instances of pathways directly
bypassing smaller markets. However, with a view to future research, we cannot currently
assess the extent to which the clustering of village to market pathways (1) is directly caused
by aggregation or (2) has significantly influenced the affordability of F&V in bypassed local
markets. Therefore, the observed spatiotemporal patterns better represent a baseline of
barriers that resist aggregation schemes achieving more equitable distribution.
Thirdly, aggregation pathways are also constrained by various value chain characteristics.
Despite operating in an unregulated, traditional market system, commission agents remain
important sources of agricultural, informational and financial inputs. Long-standing trust-
based relationships can be hard to break and build, particularly if the F&V supply does not
conform to local demands. Additional layers of informal governance, such as the tendency of
local traders to inflate prices for retail transactions and the dominance of distance traders in
regional hubs, further suppress F&V accessibility in local markets.
Finally, aggregation schemes such as Loop require support from the broader enabling
environment, particularly government policy, to leverage widespread nutritional benefits.
For example, introducing subsidies to equitably offset the extra costs of supplying rural
markets might encourage farmers to divert F&V away from larger markets in the short term.
However, the strategy may become socioeconomically unsustainable for actors across the
value chain without any stimulation of demand, such as upgraded transport infrastructure to
improve consumer accessibility and/or the growth of cold chains to stabilise prices.
Therefore, wider enabling environments may themselves have to be upgraded before the full
consumer-facing potential of aggregation can be unlocked.
Notes
1. One Indian rupee (Rs 1) 5 0.014 US dollars (25th November 2020).
2. Loop has undergone rapid changes since late-2018 as it moves towards a subscription-based model.
This paper assesses the traditional aggregation model (Section 2) as it is most generalisable and
covers the period of quantitative data (January 2016–September 2018).
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Appendix 1
Overview of interview discussion topics
Participant Major topic Sub-topics




(1) Farming experience and crop specialisation (e.g. staple,




(1) Factors influencing Loop membership and day-to-day
participation, (2) interactions with Loop aggregators with
regards to market and trader choices; (3) financial and non-
financial benefits of Loop participation; (4) secondary Loop
services (e.g. price information line and digital receipts)




(1) Commission rates incurred, (2) price negotiation
strategies, (3) access to market facilities (e.g. weighing,
grading/sorting, storage), (4) credit activities
Household F&V
consumption and waste
(1) Potential relationships between on-farm or market
conditions and household consumption of own produce (e.g.
production volumes or market prices); (2) drivers of on-farm
and postharvest losses
Hopes (and fears) for loop (1) Perceived shortcomings of current aggregation scheme;
(2) hopes for future iterations of the aggregation scheme
(continued )
Table A1.
Overview of the range
of discussion topics







Participant Major topic Sub-topics
Aggregator Demographics (1) Age, (2) village/block name, (3) educational background,
(4) secondary occupations
Role in aggregation (1) Vehicle ownership, (2) weekly and seasonal aggregation
schedules, (3) transport costs and commission, (4)
interactions with Loop aggregators with regards to market




(1) Commission incurred, (2) price information, (3) access to
market facilities (e.g. weighing, grading/sorting, storage), (4)
external influences (e.g. transport infrastructure) on market
choice
Loop services (1) Loop smartphone app, (2) digital receipts, (3) market price
hotline
Hopes (and fears) for loop (1) Perceived shortcomings of aggregation scheme; (2) hopes
for future iterations of the scheme
Commission
agent




(1) Daily capacities and costs, (2) crop specialisation, (3)
Commissions charged, (4) value chain structure (i.e. “inside”
and “outside” gaddidars), (5) seasonality of above
Interactions with other
market actors
(1) Seasonality of selling farmers and procuring traders (1)
Access to market facilities and services provided (e.g. credit
provision, weighing, grading/sorting, storage)
Barriers to trade (1) Determinants of food loss, (2) Government regulations, (3)
other perceived issues




(1) Vehicle ownership, (2) daily capacities and costs, (3) crop




(1) Decision-making process determining where to buy and
sell produce (e.g. expected profits, travel times, relationships




(1) Actors upstream and downstream of trader, (2)
commissions incurred, (3) access to market facilities (e.g.
weighing, grading/sorting, storage)
Barriers to trade (1) Determinants of food loss, (2) gendered dimensions to
trading, (3) Government regulations, (4) other perceived
issues





Quantitative data – summary statistics
Participant Major topic Sub-topics








(1) Decision-making processes in price setting, (2) most
popular products by season, (3) attributes prioritised by
consumerswhen purchasing, (4) perceptions around changes
in demand over last 2–5 years
Interactions with other
market actors
(1) Upstream procurement processes, (2) alternative
downstream selling pathways (i.e. mobile retailers), (3)
commissions, (4) access to market facilities (e.g. weighing,
grading/sorting, storage)
Food safety concerns (1) Determinants of food losses, (2) conversations with
customers around nutrition and/or food safety, (3) Any
relevant government regulations around food safety
Consumer Demographics (1) Age, (2) village/block name, (3) educational background,
(4) occupations, (5) household size
Purchasing routines (1) Types, frequency and quantities purchases (including
seasonal), (2) household expenditure on fruits and




(1) Household decision-making responsibilities about
purchases, (2) market and retailer choices, (3) produce/
retailer characteristics influencing purchasing decisions (e.g.
price discovery)
Food safety and security (1) Adaptation techniques when prices are high, (2) food
waste in household, (3) conversations with retailers
regarding food safetyTable A1.
Variable n Mean Median
Std.
dev. Min. Max. Figure
Weekly number of crops supplied to
markets in Bihar
142 36.0 35 22.2 1 81 Figure 3a
Weekly volume of supplies to markets in
Bihar (tonnes)
142 662 264 768 0.878 2,350 Figure 3b
Weekly number of markets supplied in
Bihar
142 30.3 15 30.6 1 92 Figure 3c
Weekly sale quantity per Loop farmer in
Bihar (kg/person)
142 386 367 107 189 878 Figure 3d
Weekly revenue per Loop farmer in Bihar
(Rs/person)
142 4,200 3,980 1,650 1,130 11,000 Figure 3e
Transport cost per Loop farmer in Bihar
(Rs/kg/week)
138 0.500 0.539 0.344 0 1.40 Figure 3f
Number of villages supplying eachmarket
in Bhojpur






presented in Figures 3




Composition of seasonal aggregations
Variable n Mean Median
Std.
dev. Min. Max. Figure
Number of villages suppling each market
in Buxar
46 4.60 4 2.91 1 10 Figure 4b
Total supply quantity between villages
and markets in Bhojpur (tonnes)
74 126 53.3 194 0.185 989 Figure 4a
Total supply quantity between villages
and markets in Buxar (tonnes)
46 82.5 15.4 139 0.243 635 Figure 4b
Note(s): All data refers to market transactions conducted through the Loop aggregation scheme between
January 2016 and September 2018. All values given to three significant figures where appropriate. “Std.dev.” –











Rabi Cauliflower 1,060 208 26.7 1
Eggplant 677 118 15.2 2
Tomato 467 81.1 10.4 3
Cabbage 391 65.9 8.47 4
Chilli 467 43.2 5.56 5
Peas 239 34.1 4.38 6
Bottle gourd 234 27.8 3.57 7
Raddish 254 27.1 3.48 8
French
beans
182 21.7 2.79 9
Pointed
gourd
77.0 10.2 1.98 10
Others 980 135 17.5 11–111
Zaid Cauliflower 1,550 297 15.1 1
Eggplant 1,290 214 10.9 2
Tomato 1,040 211 10.8 3
Bottle gourd 1,460 202 10.3 4
Pointed
gourd
738 109 5.56 5
Cabbage 374 89.2 4.56 6
Chilli 771 70.1 3.59 7
Cucumber 475 66.7 3.41 8
Carrot 190 62.5 3.20 9
Raddish 569 61.5 3.13 10




composition of the top
ten fruits and
vegetables aggregated
by Loop between 1st
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Kharif Bottle gourd 774 118 24.7 1
Pointed
gourd
447 68.0 14.2 2
Okra 670 52.0 10.9 3
Eggplant 313 49.3 10.3 4
Sponge
gourd
384 33.8 7.07 5
Bitter gourd 187 18.6 3.90 6
Long beans 214 13.5 2.83 7
Ivy gourd 75.1 8.60 1.80 8
Banana 58.1 7.59 1.59 9
Yam 24.4 7.55 1.56 10
Others 978 102 21.2 11–97
Note(s): The seasons are as follows: “Rabi” – 15th October to 14th March; “Zaid” – 15th March to 14th June;
“Kharif” – 15th June to 14th October. Therefore, over the period of data availability, there are 53.7 Rabi weeks,
39.4 Zaid weeks and 48.9 Kharif weeks. All values given to three significant figures where appropriateTable A3.
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